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INTRODUCTION
The Social Security administrative law system is probably the larg-
est adjudicatory system in the world.' Each year, Social Security ad-
ministrative law judges (ALJs) decide hundreds of thousands of
claims, the vast majority of which concern whether an individual appli-
cant meets the disability standards for receiving benefits under one of
two related programs: Social Security Disability Insurance and Supple-
mental Security Income.
2
The nature of Social Security hearings is sui generis. Claimants
may but need not be represented by counsel,3 although most claim-
ants are. 4 The Social Security ALJ who considers the claim is an attor-
ney,5 but there is no separate government attorney whose job is to
advocate that the claimant does not meet the relevant standards.
6
The Supreme Court has referred to Social Security hearings as
nonadversarial, 7 although that characterization may often be more as-
pirational than accurate.
The unique nature of these hearings gives rise to a multitude of
complex ethical issues concerning the conduct of representatives and
ALJs. 8 The most contentious issue is whether and to what extent
claimants' representatives are obligated to produce medical evidence
obtained in the course of developing a case that appears to be adverse
to their clients' claims. Various state and local bar organizations have
issued opinions of varying degrees of formality on this issue with con-
flicting results. 9
In recent years, Congress has addressed the requirement that
claimants and their representatives not withhold material facts
I See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983) (quotingJERRY L. MASHAW ET
AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS, at xi (1978)).
2 See generally Soc. Sec. Admin., Benefits for People with Disabilities, http://
www.ssa.gov/disability (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) (providing general information on these
two largest of the several federal programs that assist people with disabilities).
3 See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 118 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A] Social
Security claimant is permitted his own counsel or other representative if he wishes .
(emphasis added)).
4 See infta notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
5 See Soc. Sec. Admin., Legal Careers, http://www.ssa.gov/careers/legalcareers2.htm
(last visited Nov. 18, 2006) ("[ALJ a]pplicants must have practiced as an attorney for at
least 7 years.").
6 See, e.g., Sims, 530 U.S. at 111 ("It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and
develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.... The Commissioner has
no representative before the ALJ to oppose the claim for benefits .... " (citation omitted)).
7 Id. at 110-11 ("Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than
adversarial.").
8 See, e.g., Jason D. Vendel, Note, General Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There a
Remedy for Social Security Claimants?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 769 (2005) (examining the preva-
lence of general bias among ALJs and the inadequate hearing procedures for Social Secur-
ity claims).
9 See infta Part III.
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through three separate pieces of legislation: the Social Security Inde-
pendence and Program Improvements Act of 1994,10 the Foster Care
Independence Act of 1999,11 and, most recently, the Social Security
Protection Act of 2004.12 Additionally, the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) has addressed the issue through proposed and final regula-
tions, as well as a formal ruling. 3 Once the relevant provisions of the
Social Security Protection Act of 2004 take effect, both claimants and
their representatives will have a duty to disclose material facts in Social
Security proceedings when failure to do so would be misleading."1
Nevertheless, even with this much-needed clarity, difficult issues
will remain. Will the law still permit a representative to withhold ad-
verse evidence that he or she deems to be purely a matter of opinion
rather than of fact? Will a representative be required to obtain, at the
representative's or claimant's expense, preexisting information that
will almost certainly be harmful to the claim? Will a representative
who has decided to withdraw from a case have an obligation to file or
withhold an adverse medical report before withdrawing? What obliga-
tion will a representative have if he or she obtains information after a
victory for his or her client that strongly suggests that the case lacked
merit?
These issues are further complicated by claims that the Social Se-
curity Protection Act of 2004 will conflict with state bar ethics rules.
Indeed, many representatives assert that their obligations under state
bar ethics rules will prevent them from complying with any federal
mandate to produce adverse evidence. 15 This position, however, mis-
apprehends the majority of state and local bar opinions and is at odds
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and basic constitutional
notions of supremacy.
10 Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-296, 108 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.).
I I Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
12 Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.).
1-3 See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1740(a) (2), 416.1540(a) (2) (2006); Social Security Ruling
00-2p: Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Claims Involving the
Issue of "Similar Fault" in the Providing of Evidence, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,140, 10,140 (Feb. 25,
2000); Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security In-
come for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Standards of Conduct for Claimant Representa-
tives, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,404 (Aug. 4, 1998) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
14 See Social Security Protection Act of 2004 § 201 (imposing a civil monetary penalty
for withholding material facts).
15 See, e.g., Commissioner of Social Security's Proposed Improvements to the Disability Determi-
nation Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources & Subcomm. on Social Security of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Thomas D. Sutton,
President, National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives), reprinted in
Soc. SECURITY F. (Nat'l Org. of Soc. Sec. Claimants' Representatives, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.), Sept. 2005, at 8-9.
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Part I provides an overview of the Social Security administrative
hearings process and the role of adverse evidence and describes how
the process results in complex ethical issues for claimants' representa-
tives. Part II provides a brief history of the shifting evidentiary respon-
sibilities of Social Security representatives under federal statutes and
regulations. Part III explores the debate among attorneys and bar as-
sociations regarding whether state bar ethics rules prohibit disclosure
of adverse evidence in Social Security proceedings. Finally, the Article
concludes that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which most
states have adopted at least in part, and the Supremacy Clause prevent
any such conflict between the states and the federal government. Ac-
cordingly, attorneys will have a duty to disclose adverse evidence as
required by the Social Security Protection Act of 2004 once the rele-
vant provisions take effect.
I
THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND THE ISSUE
OF ADVERSE EVIDENCE
Every year, hundreds of thousands of claimants apply to SSA for
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits under Title II of the So-
cial Security Act,16 for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI
of the Act,17 or for both, which is known as a "concurrent claim." 18
Although SSA handles many types of claims that may involve an array
of nondisability issues, including claims for retirement and survivors'
benefits,' 9 determining whether claimants meet the disability stan-
dards takes up the vast bulk of administrative time and resources.
A disability benefits claim is subject to a series of determinations
that are not uniform nationwide. First, a claimant receives an initial
determination on his or her disability benefits claim.20 A state agency
in the claimant's state of residence contracts with SSA to make this
determination. 21 Normally, if a claim is rejected on an initial determi-
nation, the claimant may seek "reconsideration," a second administra-
tive determination, 22 that the state agency also performs.23 In recent
years, however, SSA has experimented with eliminating the reconsid-
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (2000).
17 Id. §§ 1381-1383f.
18 See, e.g., Mazza v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 903 F.2d 953, 954 (3d
Cir. 1990).
19 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2000).
20 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901-404.905, 416.1400-416.1406 (2006).
21 See id. §§ 404.1610-404.1618, 416.903, 416.1010-416.1013.
22 Id. §§ 404.907, 416.1407. When, and if, the Commissioner's Disability Service Im-
provement (DSI) process goes into effect, the reconsideration step will be replaced with a
review by a "Federal reviewing official." 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.201-405.230 (2006).
23 See id. §§ 404.917, 416.1415.
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eration step. Instead, SSA has designated a few states, such as Penn-
sylvania, as "prototype" states,24 in which claimants appeal an adverse
initial determination directly to what otherwise would be the third
level of administrative determination, a hearing before a Social Secur-
ity ALJ.
2 5
At the ALJ hearing, a claimant has the opportunity to appear
before a legally trained decision maker, give testimony, present wit-
nesses under oath, and cross-examine expert witnesses who may be
called by the ALJ. 26 All testimony is recorded throughout the hear-
ing.27 Following the ALJ hearing, a claimant whose claim has been
fully or partially denied may seek review from the Appeals Council,28
or the Appeals Council may choose to review an ALJ decision on its
own motion. 29 Typically, if the Appeals Council denies the claim, it
simply adopts the ALJ decision as the final decision of the Commis-
sioner of Social Security. 30
The sheer number of ALJ decisions is staggering. According to
SSA statistics, Social Security ALJs disposed of 561,461 claims in 2004
and 599,875 claims in 2005. 3 1 SSA's 2006 goal was to conduct 580,000
ALJ hearings.3
2
Although claimants may seek administrative review by the Ap-
peals Council, the only formal hearing occurs at the ALJ stage.33 Be-
cause there is no further hearing within the adjudicatory system
(absent a remand),34 the record created at the ALJ hearing is critical.
Moreover, should the claimant appeal SSA's final administrative de-
24 Modifications to the Disability Determination Procedures; Disability Claims Process
Redesign Prototype, 64 Fed. Reg. 47,218, 47,218-19 (Aug. 30, 1999).
25 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929-404.930, 416.1429-416.1430 (2006).
26 See generally id. §§ 404.929-404.961, 416.1429-416.1461 (including the various pro-
cedural provisions governing an ALJ hearing).
27 Id. § 404.951.
28 See id. §§ 404.967, 416.1467. The Commissioner's DSI process will replace the Ap-
peals Council with a Decision Review Board. See Administrative Review Process for Adjudi-
cating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,424, 16,437-38 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be
codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 405). Claimants will not generally have a fight to appeal an ALJ's
denial of benefits to the Decision Review Board. See id. at 16,438.
29 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (2006).
30 See, e.g., McCrea v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 359 (3d Cir. 2004) ("After
McCrea's request for review by the Appeals Council was denied, the decision of the ALJ
became the final ruling of the Commissioner.").
31 OFFICE OF POLICY & OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION & STATISTICS, Soc. SEC. AD-
MIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2005 tbl.2.F9
(2006). SSA may have disposed of some of these claims without a hearing, as when an ALJ
issues a favorable decision on the written record or dismisses a hearing request as having
been untimely filed. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.948, 416.1448 (2006).
32 OFFICE OF CHIEF STRATEGIC OFFICER & OFFICE OF STRATEGIC MGMT., SOC. SEC. AD-
MIN., PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 AND REVISED FINAL PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2005 5 (2005), http://www.ssa.gov/performance/2006/FY2006PerfPlan.pdf.
33 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-404.982, 416.1466-416.1482 (2006).
34 20 C.F.R. § 416.1477 (2006).
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nial to federal court, the Commissioner is required to file with the
court the complete administrative record, including the hearing tran-
script, in order to facilitate judicial review.
35
For a number of reasons, the ALJ hearing is often the most im-
portant stage of the adjudicatory process. First, although most suc-
cessful claimants prevail at the initial determination level, ALJ
decisions still account for over twenty-two percent of allowances na-
tionally.36 Second, in the event that an ALJ denies a claim and the
claimant appeals, the record created at the ALJ hearing is subject to
administrative and, possibly, judicial review.
37
Despite the massive scope of the Social Security ALJ hearing sys-
tem and its impact on hundreds of thousands of Americans annu-
ally,38 the Supreme Court has addressed the nature of these hearings
in detail only once, almost four decades ago, in Richardson v. Perales.39
Perales primarily involved a claim that written medical reports admit-
ted at a hearing did not constitute "substantial evidence" for purposes
of judicial review of a benefits denial where the reports were contra-
dicted by the live testimony of the claimant's treating physician and
the claimant himself.40 In rejecting this argument, the Court made a
number of pronouncements that remain highly pertinent today. Af-
ter a review of the statutory and regulatory framework, the Court
concluded:
[I]t is apparent that (a) the Congress granted the [Commissioner]
the power by regulation to establish hearing procedures; (b) strict
rules of evidence, applicable in the courtroom, are not to operate at
social security hearings so as to bar the admission of evidence other-
wise pertinent; and (c) the conduct of the hearing rests generally in
the [ALJ's] discretion. 4
1
The Court rejected two other claims raised by Perales. Perales
attacked the ALJ's use of a medical adviser 42 at the hearing because
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
36 See Disability Determinations and Appeals Fiscal Year 2004, Soc. SECURITY F. No. (Nat'l
Org. of Soc. Sec. Claimants' Representatives, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.), Apr. 2005, at 23.
37 See supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text.
38 See supra note 32.
39 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
40 See id. at 399.
41 Id. at 400. At the time of Perales, "hearing examiners," not ALJs, conducted disabil-
ity hearings at the direction of the Secretary of the (now defunct) Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. Now the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration has
the responsibility for overseeing disability hearings. See id. at 389; Soc. Sec. Admin., SSA
History, http://www.ssa.gov/history/orghist.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) (noting that
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare operated from 1953 to 1980). 1 have
substituted the current titles in the above quotation and throughout this Article.
42 The term "medical expert" has replaced "medical adviser." See OFFICE OF DISABLIT'Y
ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., HALLEX: HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION
LAW MANUAL § 1-2-5-32 (2005), http://www.ssa.gov/OPHome/hallex/.
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the adviser had never examined Perales and instead relied on the
opinions of prior consultative examiners who were not present at the
hearing to be cross-examined. 43 The Court, however, found "nothing
'reprehensible' in the practice."44 Perales also challenged the consti-
tutionality of the ALJ being an employee of the agency whose respon-
sibility it is to gather evidence and, allegedly, "to make the
Government's case as strong as possible."45 Perales asserted that both
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and due process required an
"independent" ALJ.46 Without deciding whether the APA applies to
Social Security claims, the Court rejected Perales's "advocate-judge-
multiple-hat suggestion. '47 According to the Court, SSA "operates es-
sentially, and is intended so to do, as an adjudicator and not as an
advocate or adversary."48 Although the Court did not rule on this par-
ticular issue, it did express concern that given the "vast workings of
the social security administrative system," 49 unnecessary procedural re-
quirements could prove particularly burdensome. 50 The paramount
issue, the Court concluded, is "the procedure's integrity and funda-
mental fairness," which it found to be undisturbed in this instance.
5 1
The same is true today: Any discussion of SSA's hearings procedures
should be guided by the twin concerns of the procedures' integrity
and fundamental fairness.
ALJs conduct Social Security hearings de novo.5 2 Nevertheless,
unlike the procedure in a typical civil trial, ALJs receive a great deal of
information prior to hearings, including state agency files from the
initial determination and reconsideration stages that are forwarded to
the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR), formerly
the Office of Hearings and Appeals. 53 ALJs review the evidence prior
to the hearing and have the explicit authority to grant a favorable
43 See Perales, 402 U.S. at 395-96.
44 Id. at 408 (quoting the claimant).
45 Id. at 408-09 (quoting the claimant).
46 Id. at 409.
47 Id. at 410.
48 Id. at 403.
49 Id. at 403 n.2.
50 See id. at 406. Amusingly, the Court was concerned about the potential impact of its
decision on SSA's "over 20,000 disability claim hearings annually," id., a number almost
thirty times less than today's docket. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
51 See Perales, 402 U.S. at 410.
52 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 416.1429 (2006); see also Soc. Sec. Admin., Information
About Social Security's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, http://www.ssa.gov/
oha/about_odar.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) (describing the work of ALJs as con-
ducting "impartial 'de novo' hearings and mak[ing] decisions on appealed determinations
involving retirement, survivors, disability, and supplemental security income").
53 See, e.g., OHA Is No More: Meet ODAR Soc. SECURITy F. (Nat'l Org. of Soc. Sec.
Claimants' Representatives, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.), Apr. 2006, at 1 (reporting SSA Com-
missioner Barnhart's April 3, 2006, announcement of the establishment of the Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR)); Soc. Sec. Admin., supra note 52.
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decision to the claimant on the written record without holding an oral
hearing. 54 Claimants, therefore, are expected to submit medical re-
ports and other relevant evidence to ALJs in advance of hearings.55
Indeed, in March 2006, the Commissioner issued rules to require that
all evidence must be submitted at least five days prior to a hearing,
with limited exceptions.
5 6
Typically, a claimant engages an attorney prior to the ALJ hear-
ing. In 2004, attorneys represented claimants at 72.6% of all ALJ
hearings.5 7 Additionally, nonattorney representatives were present at
13.8% of all ALJ hearings in 2004.58 Perhaps the most critical part of
a representative's job is identifying missing medical evidence and up-
dating medical records to submit to the ALJ.5 9 In addition to procur-
ing and submitting his or her client's preexisting medical records, a
representative often seeks the opinion of health care providers as to
the nature and severity of the client's impairments. Accordingly, SSA
has created two forms-one for physical impairments and one for
mental impairments-so that providers can give Medical Source State-
ments of limitations.60 It is common for an ALJ prior to a hearing to
direct counsel to obtain Medical Source Statements from the claim-
ant's medical care providers.
In many instances, an attorney will learn of other legal proceed-
ings in which the client's medical condition was, or is, at issue. These
secondary proceedings may include personal injury actions, medical
malpractice claims, disability discrimination proceedings, long-term
disability claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) ,61 and, perhaps most commonly, workers' compensation
54 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.948, 416.1448 (2006).
55 See id. §§ 404.935, 416.1435.
56 20 C.F.R. § 405.331 (2006) (stating the rationale for the new procedures as helping
to "ensure that adjudicators receive evidence in a timely manner resulting in a more effi-
cient determination process while protecting the rights of the claimant"). For now, this
provision applies only in Social Security Region I, which consists of the New England states.
See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg.
16,424, 16,448-49 (Mar. 31, 2006).
57 See Soc. Sec. Admin., Profile of Participant Involvement at Hearings Held for Fiscal
Year 2004, at 1 (Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with author). For a more detailed analysis of repre-
sentation figures by type of claim, see Soc. SEC. ADVISORY BD., DISABILITY DECISION MAKING:
DATA AND MATERIALS 78 (2006), http://www.ssab.gov/documents/chartbook.pdf.
58 See Soc. Sec. Admin., supra note 57, at 1. In 2004, both an attorney and a nonat-
torney representative were present at 3.5% of all ALJ hearings. See id.
59 Cf Case Law Developments, 2 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 16, 28 (2005)
(noting the ALJ's heightened duty to develop the record in the absence of a nonattorney
representative).
60 Office of Hearings &Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin., Form HA-1151-U4, Medical Source
Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Physical) (on file with author); Office
of Hearings & Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin., Form HA-1152-U3, Medical Source Statement of
Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Mental) (on file with author).
61 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
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claims. Because these secondary proceedings are adversarial, they
often include medical reports that minimize the seriousness of the
claimant's medical conditions. In the context of ERISA claims, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged this problem: "Nor do we question
the Court of Appeals' concern that physicians repeatedly retained by
benefits plans may have an incentive to make a finding of not disabled
in order to save their employers money and to preserve their own con-
sulting arrangements. "62
Occasionally, an attorney representing a Social Security claimant
also represents the claimant in one or more secondary legal matters,
and, as a result, already has in his or her possession negative medical
reports from an adverse source. But the attorney who becomes aware
of an ancillary legal proceeding that he or she is not handling will also
normally be able to obtain such reports, either with or without paying
for them.
In an effort to build the case for disability, the zealous advocate is
likely to communicate with one or more past or present health care
providers to request a report that documents his or her client's condi-
tion(s), provides medical findings, and lists the type and severity of
any exertional or nonexertional impairments. 63 Furthermore, the re-
quest may ask the provider to express an opinion as to whether the
claimant has a condition that meets or equals one of the enumerated
impairments found in SSA's Listing of Impairments. 64 If the ALJ finds
that a claimant who is not working meets a listed impairment or has its
equivalent, the claimant must be found to be disabled.65 Often the
attorney's request will be accompanied by a residual functional capaci-
ties form for the treatment provider to fill out and return with the
report. Not surprisingly, the more treatment providers the attorney
asks for reports, the more likely it is that one or more of the responses
will contain matter that is less than helpful or outright harmful to the
claim.
These scenarios give rise to a host of ethical issues. Chief among
them is whether an attorney who possesses, or has the ability to obtain,
reports or records that include material deleterious to the claim (a)
must submit that material to the ALJ, (b) may submit that material to
the ALJ, or (c) is precluded from submitting that material to the
62 Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832 (2003).
63 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a (2006) (defining what constitutes both "exertional" and
"non-exertional" impairments in Social Security claims).
64 See, e.g., Soc. Sec. Admin., Listing of Impairments - Adult Listings (Part A), http://
www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/AdultListings.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2006) (detailing the categories of adult disabilities that qualify for Social Security benefits).
65 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404, subpt. P, app. 1, 416.925 (2006); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 141 (1987) ("If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments,
the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.").
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ALJ. 66 SSA and Congress have addressed this issue repeatedly over
the last decade but have failed to create consistency within the law.
II
THE FEDERAL STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGARDING
EVIDENTIARY RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOCIAL SECURITY PROCEEDINGS: A
HISTORICAL PROGRESSION
A. The Social Security Independence and Program
Improvements Act of 1994
In the 1994 statute separating SSA from the Department of
Health and Human Services, Congress provided that civil monetary
penalties would apply for making false and misleading representations
during Social Security proceedings:
Any person (including an organization, agency, or other entity) who
makes, or causes to be made, a statement or representation of a material fact
for use in determining any initial or continuing right to or the
amount of-
(A) monthly insurance benefits under title II, or
(B) benefits or payments under title XVI,
that the person knows or should know is false or misleading or knows or
should know omits a material fact or makes such a statement with knowing
disregard for the truth shall be subject to, in addition to any other
penalties that may be prescribed by law, a civil money penalty of not
more than $5,000 for each such statement or representation. Such
person also shall be subject to an assessment, in lieu of damages
sustained by the United States because of such statement or repre-
sentation, of not more than twice the amount of benefits or pay-
ments paid as a result of such a statement or representation. In
addition, the Secretary may make a determination in the same pro-
ceeding to exclude, as provided in section 1128, such a person who
is a medical provider or physician from participation in the pro-
grams under title XVIII and to direct the appropriate State agency
to exclude the person from participation in any State health care
program permanently or for such period as the Secretary
determines.
66 See, e.g., Mason Hogan, Current Ethical Issues in Social Security Disability Practice, in 2
Ass'N TIAi LAw. AM. ANN. CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 2775, 2775 (2000) ("There
has always been a tension in Social Security Disability practice between the advocate's duty
of candor to the tribunal and his or her duty to represent his or her client zealously.
Specifically, this conflict has arisen when the advocate is in possession of evidence which
would be harmful to the client's claim.").
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(2) For purposes of this section, a material fact is one which the
Secretary may consider in evaluating whether an applicant is entitled to ben-
efits under title II or eligible for benefits or payments under title XW
6 7
It is at least arguable that a representative violates this provision if he
or she submits favorable evidence to an ALJ but withholds other evi-
dence that he or she deems unfavorable to the claim.
B. Social Security Administration Rules of Conduct for
Representatives
In 1998, SSA promulgated "[r]ules of conduct and standards of
responsibility for representatives" that apply to "[a]ll attorneys or
other persons acting on behalf of a party seeking a statutory right or
benefit. '68 Unfortunately, the rules are a model of ambiguity with re-
gard to any duty to disclose adverse evidence.
Advocates who insist that there is no such duty point to the fol-
lowing language in the rules spelling out a representative's affirmative
duties:
A representative shall, in conformity with the regulations setting forth
our existing duties and responsibilities and those of claimants ... :
(1) Act with reasonable promptness to obtain the information and evi-
dence that the claimant wants to submit in support of his or her claim, and
forward the same to us for consideration as soon as practicable. In
disability and blindness claims, this includes the obligations to assist the
claimant in bringing to our attention everything that shows that the claim-
ant is disabled or blind, and to assist the claimant in furnishing medical
evidence that the claimant intends to personally provide .... 69
Surely, these advocates argue, this language makes clear that the
duty to produce evidence encompasses only evidence that supports the
claim of disability. This argument is buttressed by the fact that the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that led to the promulga-
tion of the rules contained language that would have imposed broad
affirmative obligations on representatives.7 0 The proposed affirmative
duties would have mandated, inter alia, that a representative:
(i) Provide, upon request, identification of all known medical
sources, updated information regarding medical treatment, new or
corrected information regarding work activity, other specifically
identified information pertaining to the claimed right or benefit, or
67 Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, 1510 (codified with some differences in language at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-8 (2000)) (emphasis added).
68 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1740(a)(1), 416.1540(a)(1) (2006).
69 Id. §§ 404.1740(b), 416.1540(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
70 See Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security
Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Standards of Conduct for Claimant Representa-
tives, 62 Fed. Reg. 352, 359 (proposed Jan. 3, 1997).
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notification by the representative after consultation with the claim-
ant that the claimant does not consent to the release of some or all
of the material; and
(ii) Provide, upon request, all evidence and documentation pertain-
ing to specifically identified issues which the representative or the
claimant either has within his or her possession or may readily ob-
tain, or notification by the representative after consultation with the
claimant that the claimant does not consent to the release of some
or all of the material .... 71
SSA dropped these provisions when it adopted its final version of the
rules. Its explanation for doing so, however, was nebulous:
Based on the public comments we received, we deleted proposed
§§ 404.1740(b) (2) (i) and 416.1540(b) (2) (i), which would have re-
quired that the representative provide, upon request, information
regarding the claimant's medical treatment, vocational factors or
other specifically identified matters, or provide notification that the
claimant does not consent to release the information. We also de-
leted proposed §§ 404.1740(b)(2)(ii) and 416.1540(b)(2)(ii),
which would have required that the representative provide, upon
request, all evidence and documentation pertaining to specifically
identified issues which the representative or claimant already has or
may readily obtain. We deleted these proposed requirements to
more closely track the existing regulatory requirements that explain
a claimant's duties and responsibilities with regard to submitting ev-
idence and providing information.
72
On the other hand, the rules as promulgated do contain some
language that suggests a duty of full disclosure: "All representatives
shall be forthright in their dealings with us and with the claimant and
shall comport themselves with due regard for the nonadversarial na-
ture of the proceedings by complying with our rules and standards,
which are intended to ensure orderly and fair presentation of evi-
dence and argument. ' 73 Arguably, a representative who fails to dis-
close adverse evidence is not being "forthright." Moreover, the rules
impose the further obligation to do the following:
Assist the claimant in complying, as soon as practicable, with our
requests for information or evidence at any stage of the administra-
tive decisionmaking process in his or her claim. In disability and
blindness claims, this includes the obligation ... to assist the claim-
ant in providing, upon our request, evidence about:
71 Id.
72 Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security In-
come for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Standards of Conduct for Claimant Representa-
tives, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,404, 41,406 (Aug. 4, 1998).
73 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1740(a) (2), 416.1540(a)(2) (2006).
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(vi) Any other factors showing how the claimant's impair-
ment(s) affects his or her ability to work .... 71
This duty to assist compliance suggests that a representative must
satisfy an ALJ's request to produce all evidence in the case, irrespec-
tive of whether that evidence supports or weakens the claim. Finally,
and more generally, the rules state that a representative shall not
"[k] nowingly make or present, or participate in the making or presen-
tation of, false or misleading oral or written statements, assertions or
representations about a material fact or law concerning a matter
within our jurisdiction . . . -75 This, of course, raises the question
whether withholding adverse evidence would violate this prohibition.
Consider, for example, the not unusual situation in which a physician
sends a representative both a written report and a residual functional
capacities form, and the language in one of these documents supports
the disability claim more than the language in the other. If the repre-
sentative submits only the more supportive of the two documents to
the ALJ, has he or she violated this prohibition?
C. The Foster Care Independence Act of 1999
Five years after creating the independent SSA,76 Congress revis-
ited the integrity of Social Security proceedings. Section 207 of the
Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 added another section to the
Social Security Act imposing additional penalties for false and mis-
leading statements:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Any person who makes, or causes to be made, a state-
ment or representation of a materialfact for use in determining any initial or
continuing right to or the amount of-
(1) monthly insurance benefits under title II; or
(2) benefits or payments under title XVI,
that the person knows or should know is false or misleading or knows or
should know omits a material fact or who makes such a statement with
knowing disregard for the truth shall be subject to, in addition to
any other penalties that may be prescribed by law, a penalty de-
scribed in subsection (b) to be imposed by the Commissioner of
Social Security.
(b) PENALTY.- The penalty described in this subsection is-
(1) nonpayment of benefits under title II that would otherwise
be payable to the person; and
(2) ineligibility for cash benefits under title XVI,
for each month that begins during the applicable period described
in subsection (c).
74 Id. §§ 404.1740(b)(2), 416.1540(b)(2) (2006).
75 Id. §§ 404.1740(c) (3), 416.1540(c)(3) (2006).
76 See supra Part II.B.
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(c) DURATION OF PENALTY.-The duration of the applicable period,
with respect to a determination by the Commissioner under subsec-
tion (a) that a person has engaged in conduct described in subsec-
tion (a), shall be-
(I) six consecutive months, in the case of the first such deter-
mination with respect to the person;
(2) twelve consecutive months, in the case of the second such
determination with respect to the person; and
(3) twenty-four consecutive months, in the case of the third or
subsequent such determination with respect to the person.
77
Thus, by adding periods of ineligibility for benefits to which the claim-
ant would otherwise be entitled, this provision significantly increased
the penalties contained in the Social Security Independence and Pro-
gram Improvements Act of 1994.
D. Social Security Ruling 00-2p: Fraud and Similar Fault
The Social Security Act declares:
The Commissioner of Social Security shall immediately redetermine
the entitlement of individuals to monthly insurance benefits . . . if
there is reason to believe that fraud or similar fault was involved in
the application of the individual for such benefits.... When rede-
termining the entitlement, or making an initial determination of
entitlement, of an individual... the Commissioner... shall disre-
gard any evidence if there is reason to believe that fraud or similar
fault was involved in the providing of such evidence.
78
The statute then goes on to define similar fault as follows:
[S]imilar fault is involved with respect to a determination if-
(i) an incorrect or incomplete statement that is material to the
determination is knowingly made; or
(ii) information that is material to the determination is know-
ingly concealed.
79
Issued by SSA in February 2000, Social Security Ruling (SSR) 00-
2 p seeks to clarify this concept of "similar fault."80 The ruling speci-
77 Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, § 1129A, 113 Stat.
1822, 1837-38 (1999) (codified with some differences in language at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1320a-8(a) (1) (West 2006)) (emphasis added).
78 42 U.S.C. § 405(u) (1) (2000).
79 42 U.S.C. § 1383(e)(7)(B) (2000).
80 See Social Security Ruling 00-2p: Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI:
Evaluation of Claims Involving the Issue of "Similar Fault" in the Providing of Evidence, 65
Fed. Reg. 10,140, 10,140 (Feb. 25, 2000). Social Security rulings do not have the authority
of regulations duly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Heckler v.
Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3 (1984) ("Once published, a ruling is binding on all compo-
nents of the Social Security Administration in accordance with [20 C.F.R. pt. 422]. Rulings
do not have the force and effect of the law or regulations but are to be relied upon as
precedents in determining other cases where the facts are basically the same. A ruling may
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fies that a finding of similar fault "can be made only if there is reason
to believe, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the person
committing the fault knew that the evidence provided was false or in-
complete. A 'similar fault' finding cannot be based on speculation or
suspicion."8' Moreover, "a finding of 'fraud' made as part of a crimi-
nal prosecution" is not a requirement of finding "similar fault."
8 2
E. The Social Security Protection Act of 2004
Congress revisited these issues yet again in the Social Security
Protection Act (SSPA) of 2004.83 Section 201 of the SSPA amends the
civil penalties provisions enacted in the Foster Care Independence
Act of 1999, which penalized a declarant for making a statement or
representation of a material fact that he or she knew or should have
known omitted a material fact.8 4 The SSPA adds that a declarant will
face a civil monetary penalty if he or she:
(C) omits from a statement or representation for such use, or other-
wise withholds disclosure of, a fact which the person knows or should know is
material to the determination of any initial or continuing right to or
the amount of monthly insurance benefits under title II or benefits
or payments under title VIII or XVI, if the person knows, or should
know, that the statement or representation with such omission is
false or misleading or that the withholding of such disclosure is
misleading ... "85
The Ways and Means Committee report accompanying the bill
that became the SSPA explains in pertinent part:
Currently the SSA cannot impose civil monetary penalties and as-
sessments on a person who should have come forward to notify the
SSA of changed circumstances that affect eligibility or benefit
amount, but did not. To be subject to civil monetary penalties and
assessments under the current law, an individual must have made a
statement that omitted a material fact or was false or misleading.
Examples of the types of individuals intended to be covered under
this amendment to Section 1129 and 1129A include (but are not lim-
ited to): (1) an individual who has ajoint bank account with a benefi-
be superseded, modified, or revoked by later legislation, regulations, court decisions or
rulings.").
81 Social Security Ruling 00-2p: Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evalu-
ation of Claims Involving the Issue of "Similar Fault" in the Providing of Evidence, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 10,141 (emphasis added).
82 Id.
83 Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493, 493-541
(2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-8(a) (1) (West 2006)).
84 See Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, § 1129A, 113 Stat.
1822, 1837-38 (1999) (codified with some differences in language at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1320a-8(a) (1) (West 2006)).
85 Social Security Protection Act of 2004 § 201 (emphasis added).
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ciary in which the SSA direct deposited the beneficiary's Social
Security checks; upon the death of the beneficiary, this individual
fails to advise the SSA of the beneficiary's death, instead spending
the proceeds from the deceased beneficiary's Social Security checks;
and (2) an individual who is receiving benefits under one SSN while
working under another SSN.
86
A classic example of fraudulent failure to report a change in cir-
cumstances is the failure of a benefits recipient to report a return to
work. Congress was concerned, however, that SSA would mistakenly
accuse benefits recipients of fraudulently failing to report a change in
circumstances. 87 SSA has too frequently failed to record recipients'
reports of changed circumstances-especially those made to SSA's
toll-free phone number-or to include the new information in recipi-
ents' files. 88 To combat this problem, Congress tied the effective date
of § 201 of the SSPA to SSA's implementation of § 202 of the SSPA,
8 9
which requires SSA to issue a receipt each time a disabled beneficiary
reports a change in status.90 Congress mandated that this receipt sys-
tem be created no later than one year after March 2, 2004, the SSPA's
date of enactment.9 1 SSA did not, however, issue proposed rules im-
plementing § 202 until October 18, 2005,92 and did not finalize those
rules until November 17, 2006, effective December 18, 2006.
9 3
SSA published two sets of proposed rules implementing § 201 of
the SSPA. SSA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) authored the first
set, which was published as proposed in the Federal Register on
March 23, 2005, 9 4 and in final form on May 17, 2006.9 5 The final
regulations track the statutory language of § 201 and authorize the
OIG to impose a penalty or assessment on any person who the OIG
determines to have:
Omitted from a statement or representation, or otherwise withheld
disclosure of, a material fact for use in determining any initial or
continuing right to or amount of benefits or payments, which the
86 H.R. REP. No. 108-46, at 33 (2003).
87 See supra text accompanying note 77.
88 See H.R. REP. No. 108-46, at 34.
89 Social Security Protection Act of 2004 § 201(d).
90 Id.
91 42 U.S.C.A. § 902 (West 2006).
92 See Rules for the Issuance of Work Report Receipts, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,463, 60,463-68
(proposed Oct. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
93 See Rules for the Issuance of Work Report Receipts, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,860 (Nov. 17,
2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
94 Civil Monetary Penalties, Assessments and Recommended Exclusions, 70 Fed. Reg.
14,603, 14,603-07 (proposed Mar. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
95 Civil Monetary Penalties, Assessments and Recommended Exclusions, 71 Fed. Reg.
28,574, 28,574-81 (May 17, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 498).
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person knew or should have known was material for such use and
that such omission or withholding was false or misleading.
96
Although the above regulation is final, it will not become effective
until SSA implements the centralized computer file required by § 202
of the SSPA.
97
SSA published a second set of proposed rules implementing
§ 201 of the SSPA in October 2005.98 The language of these proposed
rules, like the first set, tracks the statutory language of § 201:
We propose to amend §§ 404.459 and 416.1340 of our regulations
by revising the heading and paragraphs (a) and (e) of each section
to reflect that, as a result of section 201 of the SSPA, an individual
will be subject to the penalty if he or she withholds information that
is material for use in determining any right to or the amount of
monthly benefits... if the person knows, or should know, that the
withholding of the information is misleading. 99
F. The Commissioner's July 2005 Administrative Redesign
Proposals
On July 27, 2005, following lengthy consideration, SSA Commis-
sioner Jo Anne Barnhart formally proposed extensive changes to the
administrative system for adjudicating Social Security claims. 10 0
Among the proposed changes was an obligation to submit all
evidence:
We propose to require that you submit all evidence available to you
when you request your hearing. This rule will require you to submit
all available evidence that supports the allegations that form the ba-
sis of your claim, as well as all available evidence that might under-
mine or appear contrary to your allegations. 10 1
Significantly, Commissioner Barnhart's proposed rule encom-
passed "all evidence available," not just evidence concerning "material
facts."10 2  Under SSA's regulations, the term "evidence" is very
96 20 C.F.R. § 498.102(a)(3) (2006).
97 Civil Monetary Penalties, Assessments and Recommended Exclusions, 71 Fed. Reg.
28,574, 28,575 (May 17, 2006).
98 Representative Payment Policies and Administrative Procedure for Imposing Penal-
ties for False or Misleading Statements or Withholding of Information, 70 Fed. Reg.
60,251, 60,251-56 (proposed Oct. 17, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 408 &
416).
99 Id. at 60,252.
100 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 70 Fed.
Reg. 43,590, 43,590-624 (proposed July 27, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405,
416 & 422).
101 Id. at 43,602.
102 Id.
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broad. 10 3 It includes medical opinions, statements the claimant or
others made about the claimant's impairments, and "information"
from medical and nonmedical sources. 10 4 Due in part to its use of the
word "evidence," the proposed rule was highly controversial.'
0 5
On September 27, 2005, the House Ways and Means Subcommit-
tees on Social Security and Human Resources held a hearing on Com-
missioner Barnhart's July 27, 2005, NPRM.10 6 Panelists challenged
numerous aspects of the Commissioner's proposed regulations, in-
cluding, predictably, the requirement that claimants produce adverse
evidence.107 On behalf of the National Organization of Social Secur-
ity Claimants' Representatives, its then-president, Thomas D. Sutton,
testified:
The NPRM requires the claimant to submit all evidence "available
to you." This includes "evidence that you consider to be unfavora-
ble to your claim." The preface clarifies that this includes adverse
evidence, i.e., evidence that "might undermine" or "appear con-
trary" to the claimant's allegations.
For attorney representatives, we have serious concerns that this
requirement may conflict with state bar ethics rules which limit the
submission of evidence that could be considered adverse to a client.
This proposed requirement seems to misunderstand the general du-
ties and obligations of attorneys. In every state, attorney representa-
tives are currently bound by state bar rules that forbid an attorney
from engaging in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or willful misrepresentation. An attorney who violates this
rule is subject to disciplinary proceedings and possible sanction by
the state bar. Existing bar rules in every state also require an attor-
ney to zealously advocate on behalf of a client. An attorney who
violates this rule is also subject to sanction by the state bar.
108
In written comments to Commissioner Barnhart, then-American
Bar Association (ABA) President Michael S. Greco echoed Sutton's
concerns:
103 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.912(b) (2006) ("Evidence is anything you or any-
one else submits to us or that we obtain that relates to your claim.").
104 See id.
105 See infra text accompanying notes 108-09.
106 See Commissioner of Social Security's Proposed Improvements to the Disability Determination
Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources & Subcomm. on Social Security of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.
gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=442&comm=4.
107 See, e.g., id. (statement of Marty Ford, Co-Chair, Social Security Task Force, Consor-
tium for Citizens with Disabilities).
108 Id. (statement of Thomas D. Sutton, President, National Organization of Social
Security Claimants' Representatives), reprinted in Soc. SECUluTy F. No. (Nat'l Org. of Soc.
Sec. Claimants' Representatives, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.), Sept. 2005, at 8-9.
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[T]he current proposals are directed to claimants and appear de-
signed to circumvent the issue of ethical conflicts for lawyers. How-
ever, because lawyers step into the shoes of their clients, the
proposed rules would continue to present the same ethical dilem-
mas for duly licensed lawyers and the legal assistants who work
under their supervision. Proposed § 405.331 states: "You must sub-
mit with your request for hearing any evidence that you have availa-
ble to you." Proposed § 404.1512(c) and § 416.912(c) would
require a claimant to submit ". . . evidence that you consider to be
unfavorable to your claim .... The preface makes clear that claim-
ants would be required to submit all available evidence that sup-
ports the claim, as well as all available evidence that might
undermine or appear contrary to the claim. 70 Fed. Reg. 43602.
Like the proposals of 1995 and 1997, this requirement has the po-
tential for causing significant conflicts for lawyers torn between fol-
lowing an agency rule and complying with their professional
responsibilities towards their clients. Moreover, enforcement of
these provisions would place the Social Security Administration in
the position of attempting to override a lawyer's sworn duty to obey
the professional rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is li-
censed to practice.
No matter what the tribunal, lawyers have the ethical obligation
to advocate zealously on their clients' behalf and to advise them on
possible courses of action and the potential consequences of those
actions. They are prohibited by ABA Model Rule 1.6 from disclos-
ing privileged and confidential client information, except with con-
sent from the client and under some very limited circumstances.
Indeed, to reveal client confidences would expose them to discipli-
nary action.109
G. The Commissioner's Disability Service Improvement Process,
March 2006
In March 2006, the Commissioner promulgated final regulations
based on the July 2005 NPRM, called the Disability Service Improve-
ment (DSI) process, which began to take effect August 1, 2006.110
Pertinently, the Commissioner modified the proposed language re-
garding the duty to submit adverse evidence to read as follows: "You
must provide evidence, without redaction, showing how your impair-
109 Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, ABA, to the HonorableJo Anne Barnhart,
Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Sept. 27, 2005) (on file with author).
110 Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 16,424, 16,424-62 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 &
422). While the new regulations will affect the overall disability determination process, the
ALJ hearing will remain an important step for many claimants. See id. at 16,428, 16,436-37
(describing the continuing role of the ALJ under the new DSI process). Moreover, DSI
will initially take effect only in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. Id. at 16,440-41.
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ment(s) affects your functioning during the time you say that you are
disabled, and any other information that we need to decide your
claim."'
The explanation for this change in language provides little
information:
The proposed rule provided that claimants must submit all available
evidence that supports the claim, even evidence that might under-
mine or appear contrary to the allegations. The final rule states
that claimants must provide evidence, without redaction, showing
how their impairments affect functioning during the time they say
they are disabled.112
The final rule does not define "redaction."' 1 3 Nor does the final
rule indicate how it will affect the implementation of § 201 of the
SSPA. 114
III
STATE BAR RULES AND OPINIONS
A. American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct
Many attorneys assert that state bar ethics rules forbid them from
submitting evidence adverse to their clients' disability claims. 115 As
most states have adopted some version of the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules),1 6 these attorneys usually point
to the confidentiality provisions in their state's version of Model Rule
1.6.117 Model Rule 1.6 provides:
111 Id. at 16,444, 16,459.
112 Id. at 16,428.
113 See id. at 16,444, 16,459. The failure to define "redaction" is troubling. Unques-
tionably, an attorney who submits altered evidence is subject to disciplinary proceedings as
well as possible criminal proceedings. See, e.g., In re Watkins, 656 So. 2d 984, 984-87 (La.
1995) (suspending from legal practice for two years an attorney who had, among other bad
acts, submitted false evidence to SSA). On the other hand, it is common for attorneys not
to submit-and for ALJs not to want-everything in a claimant's medical record. Often,
the medical record will include matters that are irrelevant to the claim, such as treatment
for temporary conditions that are not part of the asserted basis for disability, insurance
information, and release forms. When a claimant has been hospitalized, for instance, it is
common for his or her representative to obtain and submit only some of the records, such
as admission and discharge summaries and operation records, and withhold other lengthy
documents such as nursing notes.
114 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,424-62.
115 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
116 See E. Norman Veasey, Introduction to MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/e2k-chair_intro.html (noting that as of Au-
gust 2002, forty-two states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of the
Model Rules).
117 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
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(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclo-
sure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation
or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that
is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the finan-
cial interests or property of another and in furtherance of
which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the finan-
cial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain
to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the
lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with
these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to re-
spond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.'
1 8
This last exception to nondisclosure, wherein an attorney reason-
ably believes disclosure is necessary "to comply with other law or a
court order," was added to the Model Rules in 2002 as part of a com-
prehensive revision of the ethics rules. 119 Of course, the fact that the
ABA has changed a Model Rule does not mean that specific states will
adopt the revision.
Another specific exception to confidentiality appears in Model
Rule 3.3 that provides: "In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall in-
form the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the
facts are adverse." 120 In light of this instruction, there has been signif-
icant debate regarding whether a Social Security ALJ hearing consti-
tutes an ex parte proceeding, since there is no opposing counsel
present to represent SSA and argue against a finding of disability.
21
118 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006).
119 See AM. BAR. ASS'N, T14E 2002 CHANGES TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT 17 (2003) (indicating revisions to Model Rule 1.6).
120 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2006).
121 See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) ("The Commissioner has no repre-
sentative before the ALJ to oppose the claim for benefits, and we have found no indication
that he opposes claimants before the Council.").
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Finally, the Model Rules contain a choice of law provision in
Model Rule 8.5(b) that reiterates the primacy of the rules of the
forum:
In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the
rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending
before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tri-
bunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise;
and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in
which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant
effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of
that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall
not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to
the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will
occur. 122
B. Application of State Ethics Rules
A number of state bars (and, in one instance, a county bar) have
issued opinions applying their bar rules to the question of whether an
attorney has a duty to produce adverse evidence in a Social Security
proceeding.
As a preliminary matter, there is no real dispute that an attorney
who comes into possession of evidence indicating that a client is com-
mitting fraud has a duty to take corrective action, 123 as the comments
of Mr. Sutton 124 and Mr. Greco 125 indicate. For example, an attorney
may learn that his or her client made misrepresentations in an affida-
vit to SSA, or falsely testified that he was not working during a certain
period when, in fact, he was.
The Illinois State Bar Association's Advisory Opinion on Profes-
sional Conduct No. 99-04 addressed the duties of an attorney who
learns that a client has failed to disclose assets, resources, or income-
information that affects financial eligibility-in the client's applica-
tion for Supplemental Security Income. 126 The opinion concluded
122 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) (2006).
123 Id. R. 3.3(b).
124 See supra text accompanying note 108.
125 See supra text accompanying note 109.
126 Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, Advisory Op. on Prof I Conduct 99-
04 (1999), [2001 Transfer Binder] 5 Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics & Prof. Resp. (University
Publications of America) IL:OPlNIONs:22. The Maryland State Bar Association Committee
on Ethics has issued a similar opinion concerning a lawyer who came into possession of
evidence establishing that his client, a child receiving Social Security survivor's benefits,
was not in fact the child of the deceased wage earner. Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Ethics, Op. 95-44 (1995) (on file with author) (stating that if the "acceptance [of benefits]
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that the attorney must disclose the hidden financial information to
the tribunal (here, SSA) to "prevent assisting the client in perpetrat-
ing a fraudulent act upon the tribunal."'127 The attorney should first
seek to persuade the client to rectify the situation, but if the client
refuses, the attorney must disclose the fraud. 128 Moreover, withdrawal
by the attorney "does not obviate or supplant the duty of disclo-
sure.... The very act of withdrawal without disclosure might or could
be construed as conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation and which is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice."1 29 The Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics has
issued a similar opinion relating to a situation in which the lawyer has
come into possession of evidence that a child receiving Social Security
survivors' benefits is not, in fact, the child of the deceased wage
earner. 1
30
Most cases involving adverse evidence are, however, not straight-
forward fraud cases. Rather, they usually involve medical reports com-
bining "facts" and "opinions" (often a difficult distinction to make)
that suggest that a client is less impaired than he or she claims. Not
surprisingly, if a representative asks more than one medical provider
to assess a client's residual functional capacity to perform various
tasks, the representative is likely to receive answers that conflict. And,
as the Supreme Court has noted, if one or more of these medical
sources is employed by, or under contract to, an entity with a financial
interest adverse to the client, the probability of disagreement is signifi-
cantly heightened.1
3 1
If Social Security proceedings are ex parte within the meaning of
Model Rule 3.3(d), then a representative clearly must produce all ad-
verse "material facts" in any jurisdiction that has adopted that rule.
32
However, two state bar opinions from states that have adopted Model
Rule 3.3(d) have addressed this question and have arrived at opposite
conclusions.
would indeed constitute a criminal or fraudulent act, Rule 3.3(a) (2) affirmatively requires
[the lawyer] to disclose such facts to the tribunal").
127 I11. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'i Conduct, supra note 126, at IL:OPINIONS:28.
128 Id.
129 Id. at IL:OPINIONS:28-29.
130 See Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 95-44, supra note 126.
131 See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832 (2003) (acknowledg-
ing concerns "that physicians repeatedly retained by benefits plans may have an incentive
to make a finding of 'not disabled' in order to save their employers money and to preserve
their own consulting arrangements"); see also Sridar V. Vasudevan & David L. Drury, The
Independent Medical Examination: Purpose and Process, Wis. MED. J., Mar.-Apr. 1999 at 10, 10
("Since the insurer selects the physician to accomplish the [Independent Medical Exam]
and pays the physician a respectable amount for the service, there is indeed potential bias
favoring the carrier.").
132 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2006); see supra text accompanying
note 121.
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In July 1993, the Alabama State Bar advised:
It is the opinion of the Disciplinary Commission that Rule 3.3(d) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Alabama State Bar applies
to lawyers participating in hearings before a Social Security Admin-
istrative Law Judge adjudicating Social Security disability, retire-
ment and survivor claims. The term "tribunal" as used in this rule
includes both courts and administrative proceedings.
1 33
In January 1999, the North Carolina State Bar concluded that a
Social Security disability hearing is not ex parte within the meaning of
Model Rule 3.3(d), and therefore lawyers have no duty to produce
adverse evidence.1 34 The North Carolina State Bar reasoned:
[A] Social Security disability hearing should be distinguished from
an ex parte proceeding such as an application for a temporary re-
straining order in which the judge must rely entirely upon the advo-
cate for one party to present the facts. In a disability hearing, there
is a "balance of presentation" because the Social Security Adminis-
tration has an opportunity to develop the written record that is
before the ALJ at the time of hearing. Moreover, the ALJ has the
authority to make his or her own investigation of the facts. When
there are no "deficiencies of the adversary system," the burden of
presenting the case against a finding of disability should not be put
on the lawyer for the claimant.
135
Interestingly, the original North Carolina Proposed Formal Eth-
ics Opinion on the subject, datedJanuary 15, 1998, reached the oppo-
site conclusion.' 3 6  The proposed opinion concluded that a
representative in possession of a letter opinion indicating that a treat-
ing physician believes the claimant is not disabled would be required
under Model Rule 3.3(d) to submit the evidence to the ALJ because,
the proposed opinion stated, the ALJ hearing is an ex parte proceed-
ing.137 In October 1998, without explanation, a revised proposed
opinion replaced the original. 138 The Ethics Committee made no ef-
fort in either the revised proposed opinion or the final opinion to
explain this change. 13 9 Likewise, no effort was made to address the
Alabama opinion mandating production.'
40
133 Ala. State Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Comm'n, Op. RO-93-06 (1993), in Robert W. Nor-
ris, Opinions of the General Counsel, ALA. LAw., July 1993, at 252, 252, available at http://
www.alabar.org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneld=79.
134 N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Ethics Op. 1 (1999), reprinted in The NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BAR LAWYER'S HANDBOOK 229 (2000).
135 Id. (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 678-79 (1986)).
136 See N.C. State Bar, Proposed 98 Formal Ethics Op. 1 (1998) (on file with author).
137 See id.
138 See N.C. State Bar, Revised Proposed 98 Formal Ethics Op. 1 (1998) (on file with
author).
139 See N.C. State Bar, supra note 134; N.C. State Bar, supra note 138.
140 See N.C. State Bar, supra note 134; N.C. State Bar, supra note 138.
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Those who argue that confidentiality rules prohibit attorneys
from producing adverse evidence will find little support in the final
North Carolina State Bar opinion, however. Although the opinion
does not require disclosure, the bar urges the production of adverse
evidence, stating that "it is a hallmark of good lawyering for an advo-
cate to disclose adverse evidence and explain to the court why it
should not be given weight."
14
In 1995, the Vermont Bar Association issued an opinion address-
ing whether an attorney representing a client with a Social Security
disability benefits claim has a duty under Vermont's version of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (the predecessor to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct) to submit medical opinion evidence
that is inconsistent with his or her client's claim. 142 Although the
opinion discusses the Social Security Act's provisions on fraud and
similar fault at length, it contains a confusing disclaimer that "[i] t is
not our role to interpret the statute."' 43 The opinion continues:
It is ... competent and ethical advocacy for an attorney to review
opinions rendered by consultants, including medical consultants,
and if the opinions do not support the client's position, to reject
them and seek out other opinions that do .... Where there is a
difference among medical opinions it is an attorney's duty on be-
half of a client . . . to reject some opinions while accepting
others.14
4
The Vermont opinion adds a number of qualifications, however.
For instance, the opinion applies only if "no direct request for produc-
tion of such materials has been made by the Administrative Law
Judge." 145 Moreover, the opinion strongly suggests that an attorney
may have an obligation to disclose "harmful medical fact" evidence. 14
6
Additionally, an attorney must disclose the medical opinion evidence
if he or she has no good faith basis for rejecting it. 147 Finally, if the
medical opinion evidence contains "information [that] is material to a
determination of benefits, the knowing concealment of the informa-
tion would be a fraud on the tribunal charged with making the benefit
141 N.C. State Bar, supra note 134.
142 See Vt. Bar Ass'n Prof I Responsibility Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 95-08 (1995),
available at http://www.vtbar.org/ezstatic/data/vtbar/attorneyjudicial resources/advi-
soryethics-opinions/1995/95-08.pdf. Vermont subsequently replaced its Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility with a version of the Model Rules. See VERMONT RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT (1999), available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/PRBI.htm.
143 Vt. Bar Ass'n Prof l Responsibility Comm., supra note 142.
144 Id. at 1-2.
145 Id. at 1.
146 Id. ("[W]e believe the statute does create disclosure obligations, but we do not
believe that disclosure of harmful medical opinion evidence necessarily falls within the am-
bit of information that must be disclosed." (emphasis added)).
147 See id. at 2.
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determination." 148 Notably, the opinion presumes that the attorney
obtained the harmful medical opinion evidence from "medical con-
sultants." 149 The opinion does not address a situation in which one of
the claimant's past or present medical service providers has rendered
a harmful opinion after treating the claimant. 15 0 The opinion con-
cludes with this warning:
Willful concealment of material information where there is a duty
to disclose constitutes fraudulent and deceitful conduct prohibited
by the code and an attorney must refrain from it and may not coun-
sel his client in pursuing such conduct. Whether harmful medical
evidence is material in any given case is a determination that the
attorney must make on a case by case basis.
15 1
In a thoughtful 1993 opinion, the New York County Lawyers' As-
sociation Committee on Professional Ethics addressed "whether a law-
yer is obliged to produce all relevant medical information about the
claimant in [the Social Security disability] process, including informa-
tion obtained from the clients which may be detrimental to the cli-
ents' claims, if no request is made for the information.' 52 Like the
Vermont Bar Association's advisory ethics opinion, this opinion deals
with an attorney's responsibility under a state version of the Code of
Professional Responsibility rather than the Model Rules. 153 The New
York County opinion emphasizes even more clearly than the Vermont
opinion that it is not addressing an attorney's duties under the statute
or regulations governing claims for Social Security benefits.
154
Rather, the opinion states a general rule: "If no law independently
mandates disclosure, then nothing in the Code [of Professional Re-
sponsibility] requires a lawyer to volunteer evidence-even evidence
relevant to the matter in issue-to a tribunal or other person before
whom the lawyer appears on behalf of a client."155 The opinion, how-
ever, adds several significant qualifications to this general rule. For
example, the rule does not apply "if the administrative judge or offi-
cials . . . request such information."'156 In addition, "nothing in the
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1.
150 Id. at 1-2.
151 Id. at 2.
152 N.Y. County Law. Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, New York County Lawyers' Ethics
Opinion: Question 698, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 1993, at 2.
153 See id. Unlike Vermont, New York is still a Code of Professional Responsibility state
and has not yet adopted the Model Rules. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, THE LAWYER'S CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2005), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/Naviga-
tionMenu/AttorneyResources/LawyersCode-of ProfessionalResponsibility/
LawyersCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.pdf.
154 See N.Y. County Law. Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, supra note 152, at 2.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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Code precludes assertion of the claim" so long as the attorney is "able
to advance a good faith claim for benefits despite knowledge of con-
trary medical reports."' 57 For example, if a second opinion from a
treating physician is intended to clarify or rescind an earlier opinion
from the same physician, the attorney must disclose the second
opinion.1
58
Three other state bars have spoken on an attorney's duty to dis-
close adverse evidence in Social Security proceedings in ways that de-
serve brief mention. In 1992, the Virginia State Bar received a
complaint from an ALJ concerning an attorney who had refused to
comply with an ALJ order to "submit any and all documentation in his
possession pertaining to [the] claimant's alleged physical and mental
impairments."' 59 The attorney had declined to do so, relying on a
previous letter to the ALJ in which he argued that such production is
not required under SSA's regulations or under its Hearings, Appeals
and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX).1 60 After considering the rele-
vant provisions of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility,
16 1
the Virginia State Bar Counsel found no wrongdoing because the at-
torney "would appear to be proceeding in the only way that he pres-
ently can to take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of
[the ALJ's] ruling."162 Therefore, counsel found, the attorney had
not violated Virginia Disciplinary Rule 7-105 (a),1 63 which states in part
that "a lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard ... a
ruling of a tribunal made in the course [of a] proceeding, but he may
take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or
ruling." 164 The Virginia State Bar Counsel specifically declined to de-
cide "whether or not [the lawyer] is legally correct in his reading of
the applicable laws concerning these proceedings."'
165
157 Id.
158 See id.
159 Letter from U.S. ALJ, Office of Hearings & Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin., to Va. State
Bar, Order of ALJ to Submit Evidence (May 1, 1992) (on file with author) (withholding
ALJ name for confidentiality reasons).
160 See Letter from Att'y to U.S. ALJ, Office of Hearings & Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin.
(Mar. 26, 1992) (on file with author) (withholding names for confidentiality reasons); see
also Letter from Att'y to U.S. AL], Off. of Hearings & Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Apr. 13,
1992) (on file with author) (names withheld for confidentiality reasons) ("I respectfully
decline to do so, for the reasons I stated in my letter to you dated March 26, 1992.").
161 Like Vermont, Virginia has since replaced its Code of Professional Responsibility
with a version of the Model Rules. SeeVIRGINIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006), available
at http://www.vsb.org/docs/2006-07_pg.pdf.
162 Letter from Assistant Bar Couns., Va. State Bar, to U.S. ALJ, Office of Hearings &
Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin. 2 (Aug. 18, 1992) (on file with author) (withholding ALJ name
for confidentiality reasons).
163 See id. at 3.
164 Id. at 2.
165 Id. at 3.
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In 1989, the Missouri State Bar issued a brief, conclusory opin-
ion 166 in response to an attorney who inquired whether he had an
ethical obligation to provide SSA with depositions arising from other
litigation involving his client.1 67 The attorney believed that some of
the depositions would be helpful to his client's Social Security claim,
others would be neutral, and a few would be harmful.1 6 The General
Chairman of the Missouri Bar Administration responded:
It is the opinion of the Advisory Committee that a lawyer has no
duty to defeat his own case. While it would be an ethical violation to
violate the provisions of Rule 3.3 of [sic] Rule 4, we do not believe
the duty exists to present every shred of evidence known supporting
every or all positions possible in litigation.
1 69
Finally, in the early 1990s, the Charleston, West Virginia SSA Of-
fice of Hearings and Appeals created a proposed Pre-Hearing Order
that would have required representatives to submit "[a]ll relevant
medical evidence ... including medical work-related assessments and
updated clinical records from treating physicians, when the same can
reasonably be produced. 1 7 0 In response, the West Virginia State Bar
issued an opposing resolution:
The West Virginia State Bar opposes that portion of paragraph 3 of
the proposed pre-hearing order of the Social Security Administra-
tion, Office of Hearings and. Appeals in Charleston, West Virginia,
which purports to require claimant[s'] attorneys or representatives
to obtain and submit evidence which may be adverse to their respec-
tive clients' interests. The State Bar is of the opinion that such a
requirement is contrary to the obligation of the claimant's attorney
to zealously represent his or her client and tends to denigrate the
advocacy role and convert the attorney into an arm of the
administration. 171
C. The Myth of the State-Bar Bar
In analyzing the various state bar opinions on the obligation to
submit adverse evidence, what the opinions do not state is perhaps
more important than what the opinions do state. Specifically, none of
the opinions suggests that an attorney may violate federal law because
of a state bar ethics rule. The Alabama State Bar finds that Model
166 Letter from Harold W. Barrick, Gen. Chairman, Mo. Bar Admin., to Dewey L. Cre-
peau, Att'y at Law, Crepeau & Roberts, P.C. (Apr. 19, 1989) (on file with author).
167 See Letter from Dewey L. Crepeau, Att'y at Law, Crepeau & Roberts, P.C., to Harold
Barrick, Att'y at Law, Mo. Bar Ethics Comm. (Apr. 7, 1989) (on file with author).
168 See id.
169 Letter from Harold W. Barrick to Dewey L. Crepeau, supra note 166.
170 Pre-Hearing Order, Office of Hearings & Appeals, Charleston, W. Va., Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Soc. Sec. Admin. (on file with author).
171 W. Va. State Bar Bd. of Governors, Resolution (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with author).
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Rule 3.3(d) requires an attorney to produce adverse evidence. 172 The
North Carolina Bar reaches the opposite conclusion. 173 Even so, the
North Carolina Bar never declares that the ethics rules bar an attor-
ney from producing adverse evidence.' 74 Rather, North Carolina
opines that it is the "hallmark of good lawyering" for an advocate to
make such a disclosure. 7 5 Although the Vermont Bar disclaims any
attempt to interpret the Social Security Act, it never suggests that an
attorney could refuse a direct request by SSA to produce adverse opin-
ion evidence.' 7 6 Nor does the Vermont Bar suggest that an attorney
could suppress a doctor's report that combines factual and opinion
evidence. 177 Similarly, the bar associations of New York County, Vir-
ginia, Missouri, and West Virginia do not address whether production
of adverse evidence is required by the Social Security Act and
regulations. 
1 78
As discussed earlier, then-President of the ABA Michael S. Greco
responded to SSA's July 2005 proposed rule of full disclosure by argu-
ing that it is inconsistent with Model Rule 1.6, which prohibits lawyers
from disclosing privileged and confidential client information without
client consent.1 7 9 Indeed, then-President Greco argued that to reveal
client confidences as instructed under the proposed rule would ex-
pose attorneys to disciplinary action. 8 0 However, Model Rule
1.6(b) (6) specifically addresses this perceived dilemma by authorizing
attorneys to disclose information "to comply with other law or a court
order."8 1 The proposed rule would have constituted "other law" had
SSA adopted it. Moreover, "for conduct in connection with a matter
pending before a tribunal," Model Rule 8.5(b) (1) applies the rules of
professional conduct of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, un-
less the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise.18 2 An attorney in a
Social Security proceeding operates under the rules of SSA,18'8 and
Model Rule 8.5(b) protects the attorney from the "catch-22" of con-
flicting rules by mandating compliance with the rules of the tribunal.
172 See Ala. State Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Comm'n, supra note 133.
173 See N.C. State Bar, supra note 134.
174 See id.
175 Id.
176 See Vt. Bar Ass'n Profrl Responsibility Comm., supra note 142.
177 See id.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 152-71.
179 See supra text accompanying note 109.
180 See id.
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6(b)(6) (2006).
182 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) (1) (2006).
183 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1540(a) (2) (2006) ("All representatives shall be forthright in
their dealings with us and with the claimant and shall comport themselves with due regard
for the nonadversarial nature of the proceedings by complying with our rules and
standards .... ).
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Even if a state's bar rules did not contain provisions similar to
Model Rules 1.6(b) (6) or 8.5(b), the notion that an attorney could be
punished by his or her state bar for complying with federal law in a
federal forum is antithetical to the Supremacy Clause. 184 In Speny v.
Florida ex rel. florida Bar, 1 5 the Supreme Court directly applied the
supremacy doctrine to practice before a federal agency:
A State may not enforce licensing requirements which, though valid
in the absence of federal regulation, give the State's licensing board
a virtual power of review over the federal determination that a per-
son or agency is qualified and entitled to perform certain functions,
or which impose upon the performance of activity sanctioned by
federal license additional conditions not contemplated by
Congress.
18 6
Indeed, it is because of the Supremacy Clause that a state bar
cannot prevent nonlawyers from representing claimants at Social Se-
curity hearings, even if the state bar believes that such representation
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. This is simply because
federal law permits nonattorney representatives.1 87 Similarly, there is
no merit to the argument that an SSA rule mandating that an attorney
disclose adverse evidence would subject an attorney to sanctions by his
or her state bar. As the Sixth Circuit recently noted, "when a state
licensing law excludes a lawyer from practice that federal rules ex-
pressly allow, the two rules do conflict, and the state law must give
way." 
1 8 8
To enforce the supremacy doctrine, a federal court may even step
in to effectively overrule a state supreme court's discipline of an attor-
ney. For example, in 2002, the Pennsylvania Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (ODC) brought a contempt action against attorney Frank
Marcone for maintaining a law office in Pennsylvania despite a court-
ordered suspension. 189 Marcone opened a Pennsylvania office for the
sole purpose of practicing before the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, which had reinstated him to practice
184 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.").
185 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
186 Id. at 385.
187 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1705(b), 416.1505(b) (2006) (establishing criteria for nonlaw-
yer representatives at Social Security hearings).
188 In re Desilets, 291 F.3d 925, 928 (6th Cir. 2002) (interpreting Sperry, 373 U.S. at
385).
189 See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Marcone, 855 A.2d 654, 668 (Pa. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1151 (2005).
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before that court. 90 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Mar-
cone's Supremacy Clause argument:
First, Mr. Marcone fails to offer any statute or rule that ex-
pressly preempts our state regulation of the practice of law in gen-
eral or of Mr. Marcone's maintenance of a law office within our
borders in particular.
Finally, we find no conflict between the federal statutes and
rules and our state rules. While an attorney's admission to federal
court may permit him to represent clients in federal court, it is not
impossible or even inconsistent in the least for Marcone to comply
with our Court's authority to regulate a suspended attorney's main-
tenance of a law office within our borders from which he holds him-
self out to the public and consults with clients, even if "limited" to a
federal practice. 19 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately held Marcone in con-
tempt of the state bar order for "maintaining a law office in the Com-
monwealth, by which he [held] himself out to the citizens of our
Commonwealth as one competent to exercise legal judgment and as
one competent in the law, and counsel[ed] clients as to their legal
rights and obligations."' 92 The Court decreed that Mr. Marcone
"[s]hall not maintain an office for the practice of law of any kind
within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."
19 3
Another similarly situated lawyer practicing in Pennsylvania, Rob-
ert Surrick, who had been suspended from practice by the Penn-
sylvania Bar but was admitted to practice before the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sued the Chief Counsel
for the Pennsylvania ODC in the Eastern District following Marcone's
loss. 194 Surrick argued that the state violated the Supremacy Clause by
prohibiting him from maintaining an office in Pennsylvania to prac-
tice in federal court.1 95 The court agreed, holding that "to the extent
that there exists a state rule prohibiting one in the position of plaintiff
from opening and maintaining an office within the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania for the purpose of representing clients pursuant to his
admission in good standing before the Eastern District, such state rule
is preempted."196 The court held that, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's prior order, Surrick could reopen his Penn-
190 See id. at 657.
191 Id. at 664-65.
192 Id. at 668.
193 Id.
194 See Surrick v. Killion, No. 04-5668, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6755, at *2-5 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 18, 2005), affd, 449 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2006).
195 See id. at *29.
196 Id. at *38.
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sylvania office, subject to various conditions intended to clarify his sta-
tus to the public.
1 9 7
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed with a
strongly worded opinion. 198 Rejecting the state's restrictive interpre-
tation of Sperry, the Third Circuit declared: "Sperry ... stands for the
general proposition that where federal law authorizes an agent to
practice before a federal tribunal, the federal law preempts a state's
licensing requirements to the extent that those requirements hinder
or obstruct the goals of federal law." 199 Moreover, the court contin-
ued: "Federal law preempts not only state laws that expressly prohibit
the very act the federal law allows, but those that 'stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives' of federal
law."
2 0 0
CONCLUSION
Because the Supremacy Clause prohibits states from restraining
an attorney's practice before a federal tribunal, it also prohibits states
from restraining an attorney from acts that are compelled by that tri-
bunal. In the unlikely and apparently unprecedented event that a
state bar were to discipline an attorney for complying with Social Se-
curity law in a Social Security proceeding, the attorney would be enti-
tled to relief in federal court under the supremacy doctrine.
The argument that SSA'sJuly 2005 proposed rule mandating dis-
closure of adverse evidence would have created a direct ethical con-
flict for attorneys in jurisdictions with conflicting state bar rules is
unfounded. Attorneys who do not wish to produce adverse evidence
are better off arguing that no direct conflict exists between the federal
and state rules, and thus, in the absence of a direct conflict, attorneys
are bound by their state bar rules. SSA has strengthened this argu-
ment by failing, without meaningful explanation, to adopt its July
2005 proposed rule on adverse evidence. 201 SSA has continued to
muddle the issue with its March 2006 retreat into ambiguous language
in the DSI process. 20 2
Nevertheless, any ambiguity in SSA's regulations cannot negate
the clear rule issued by Congress in the SSPA.203 At the very least, in a
Social Security proceeding, an attorney cannot withhold a fact that
the attorney knows, or should know, is material to a determination of
197 See id. at *40-41.
198 Surrick, 449 F.3d at 522.
199 Id. at 530.
200 Id. at 532 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 2 48 (1984)).
201 See supra Part 1.F.
202 See supra Part II.G.
203 See supra Part II.E.
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whether the client is eligible for benefits if the attorney knows, or
should know, that withholding such information will mislead the tri-
bunal. 20 4 This federal rule applies to attorneys in every state, and at-
torneys must understand that state bar rules do not and cannot
permit, much less mandate, noncompliance.
204 See supra text accompanying note 85.
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